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RESEARCH ON THE NATURE, CHARACTERISTICS, 
AND CAUSES OF ACCOUNTING ERRORS: 








Knowledge of the occurrence and detection of errors in accounting populations is of great 
importance to auditors in assessing risks, evaluating the efficacy of statistical sampling methods, 
and planning effective and efficient audit procedures to address risks. A significant body of 
research exists that examines these issues. Prior studies have focused primarily on auditor-
detected errors. A basic assumption of these studies is that detected errors are an accurate 
reflection of all significant errors present. That is, there are not a substantial number of 
undetected errors, or that undetected errors share the same characteristics (e.g., error direction) as 
detected errors. However, little evidence exists regarding the accuracy of this assumption. 
Further, there has been little consideration of factors that may affect differences between detected 
and actual errors and the implications of these differences on research conclusions.  
 
This paper presents a model of the variables involved in the error generation and error detection 
processes.  Variables that have been explored in prior research are discussed along with those 
requiring further investigation.  Finally, the paper identifies confounding variables to be 
controlled in future studies and makes suggestions for improving extant error study methods.  
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RESEARCH ON THE NATURE, CHARACTERISTICS, 
AND CAUSES OF ACCOUNTING ERRORS: 





Over the past twenty years, a significant amount of research has focused on the nature, 
characteristics, and causes of errors in accounting records.  This body of literature, known 
collectively as “error studies,” was performed primarily by gathering data of actual errors 
detected by auditors as reported in audit working papers (e.g., Bell, et al. [1998]; Maletta and 
Wright [1996]; Wright and Ashton [1989]).1  Kreutzfeldt and Wallace [1986] contains a 
summary of the error studies prior to 1986.  More recently, Eilifsen and Messier [1999] extend 
Kreutzfeldt and Wallace’s work by reviewing error studies through 1999. 
Error studies contribute to our knowledge of the characteristics of detected errors (e.g., 
frequency and direction) and are used to make inferences about the population of accounting 
errors.  However, the extent to which detected errors are, in fact, representative of the broader 
population (including undetected errors) remains an open and important question.  Conflicting 
results in some of these studies led Kreutzfeldt and Wallace to “encourage future research to 
further explain and reconcile disparate findings to date” [1990a, p. 47].  More than a dozen 
studies have been published since that time, yet the need to provide a further understanding of the 
divergent findings is still present. 
The purpose of this paper is to model the error generation and detection processes and 
review the prior literature within that framework.  Importantly, through the literature review, we 
                                                 
1 The findings from this research do not distinguish between unintentional and intentional (fraud) errors. This is 
most likely because auditors report very few instances of fraud (Loebbecke et al. 1989), since the incidence of fraud 
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trace back to the first error studies (simulations on the effectiveness of statistical sampling 
techniques), and follow the evolution to archival studies of detected errors.  Doing so reveals 
which variables in the model have been explored, and which variables require further 
exploration, representing promising avenues for future research.  The objectives of the paper are 
to identify potential factors that may help explain the conflicting results of prior studies and to 
provide suggestions for improving error study methods. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections.  The next section presents a 
model of the error generation and error detection processes.  The model includes the relationship 
between errors and inherent and control risks, as well as consideration of a number of other 
important factors, such as the design and execution of audit tests.  Section 3.0 provides a review 
of the literature, showing which variables of the model have been explored in prior research.  
Implications of the model and suggestions for future research are discussed in Section 4.0, 
followed by a summary and conclusions in the final section. 
2.0 MODEL OF THE ERROR GENERATION AND DETECTION PROCESSES 
The motivation for error studies originated with research on the use of statistical sampling 
in auditing.  In testing the effectiveness of various sampling methods, assumptions were required 
regarding the frequency and distribution of accounting errors. Kaplan used simulations to test 
auxiliary information estimators because “there is little empirical evidence on the distribution of 
book values or errors in auditing populations” [1973, p. 250].  Neter and Loebbecke [1977, 1975] 
constructed “realistic” populations to study the effectiveness and reliability of statistical sampling 
procedures, based on actual audit data from four different companies. 
                                                                                                                                                             
is rare and it may be difficult to assess whether an error is intentional. 
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Ramage, et al. [1979] greatly expanded upon the work of Neter and Loebbecke [1977, 
1975] by examining the error characteristics of 97 different audit populations of one international 
accounting firm.  At about the same time, Kinney [1979] reported the distributions of errors 
resulting in adjustments from the audits of 44 manufacturing clients of seven different accounting 
firms.  Subsequent error studies (discussed later) replicated and expanded upon the work of 
Ramage, et al.  Importantly, these studies predominately use archival data of detected errors 
obtained from audit workpapers. The implicit assumption of this research is that detected errors 
are representative of the population of actual errors. In fact, as will be discussed in the next two 
sections, error generation and error detection are two separate processes as implied by Festge 
[1979]. 
2.1 Error Generation Process 
Figure 1 provides a model of the error generation and error detection processes.  Actual 
errors (the upper portion of Figure 1) result from inherent and control risk factors.  For instance, 
errors may occur due to inherent risks such as complex judgments or problems in a client setting 
(e.g., obsolescence of high technology products) or control risks such as weak control procedures 
in failing to adequately train employees.  Moreover, a weak control environment where 
management is unduly motivated to manage earnings may result in biased accounting methods 
and disclosures.  Also, as indicated by an arrow connecting the control environment to the 
control procedures, the control risk factors may not be independent.  A weak control environment 
may motivate management to override control procedures or allow them to deteriorate.  Thus, 
inherent and control risks jointly impact the incidence of actual errors. 
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Figure 1 about here 
2.2 Error Detection Process 
2.2.1 Risk Assessment 
Auditors’ ability to detect the presence of errors is referred to as “the error detection 
process” (bottom portion of Figure 1) and is depicted to be a function of assessed risks, program 
planning, and execution.  Logically, the detection of errors is dependent upon the set of audit 
tests planned and how competently those tests are performed.  As described in auditing standards 
(e.g., SAS 47), auditors are directed to develop an audit program based on assessed client risks 
(“a risk-adjusted” program), materiality, and audit risk.  These factors are collectively referred to 
as the “audit risk model.”  The auditor’s materiality assessment is shown in the model to affect 
audit risk, since this risk is the likelihood of an unqualified opinion being issued in the presence 
of a material misstatement.2  The model in Figure 1 also includes another risk factor referred to 
as “business risk.” This factor relates to risks to the audit firm such as litigation or loss of 
reputation as a result of a particular client relationship.  Although business risk is not included as 
a component of the audit risk model, there is evidence that this factor significantly impacts 
auditing testing efforts (e.g., Pratt and Stice [1994]; Miller [1988]). 
                                                 
2It should be noted that although auditor independence also affects audit risk, the impact 
of independence on audit risk is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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2.2.2 Program Planning 
 As the perception of risk increases, auditors may select more reliable tests (nature), 
expand sample size (extent), perform tests closer to year end (timing), and/or select more 
experienced staff to perform the tests (staffing). The adequacy of audit program decisions is, 
thus, dependent at least in part upon the accuracy of auditors’ risk assessments.  If risks are 
assessed as too low (high), audit tests will be insufficient (excessive), impacting audit 
effectiveness (efficiency).  In terms of error detection, the most significant concern is assessing 
risks as too low and, thus, failing to conduct adequate tests to identify the presence of an error. 
Further, the appropriateness of audit tests depends on the ability of the auditor to design a 
program plan to correspond with client risks.  The complexity of performing this task has led 
some of the major auditing firms to use computerized decision tools that suggest an appropriate 
set of audit tests given the auditor’s risk assessments (e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers [Winograd, 
et al., 2000]; Grant Thornton’s “ADAPT” approach [Gillett, 1993]). 
2.2.3 Program Execution 
Detection of errors is also dependent upon the execution of tests.  A very strong set of 
tests may, nonetheless, fail to identify an error if, for instance, an unrepresentative sample is 
drawn (sampling risk) or an improperly trained auditor performs or evaluates the test 
inappropriately (non-sampling risk).  Both sampling and non-sampling risk relate to the 
reliability of the evidence that is used to reach appropriate audit conclusions.  Reliability of 
evidence is an element of “detection risk,” as articulated in the audit risk model (SAS 47). 
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2.2.4 Factors Underlying Error Detection 
Underlying risk assessment, program planning, and execution are four broad factors that 
affect these processes: auditing and firm standards; decision tools; individual auditor 
characteristics; and environmental factors.  Not surprisingly, standards both from the profession 
(SAS’s) and the firm provide guidance that affect risk assessments and program planning and 
execution (see, e.g., Libby and Libby [1989]; Cushing and Loebbecke [1986]). 
The use of decision tools, such as risk questionnaires and standard audit programs (e.g., 
Mock and Wright [1999, 1993]; Quadackers, et al. [1996], Bedard [1989]; Wright [1988]) in the 
planning and testing phase are pervasive in audit practice and influence auditor judgments.  
Mock and Wright [1999, 1993] report that a standard audit program was used in over two-thirds 
of the engagements studied; they suggest that the use of such programs may account for the lack 
of variation in audit tests across clients with varying risk levels. 
Findings from behavioral research (e.g., Libby and Tan [1994]; Libby and Luft [1993]) 
indicate that auditor performance is affected by individual characteristics such as knowledge, 
experience, motivation, ability, and ethics.  Further, humans are known to resort to decision 
heuristics (often with biases) to deal with complex judgment and decision situations.  Such 
heuristics may have functional or dysfunctional effects (e.g., confirmatory testing strategies or 
professional skepticism and conservatism [Smith and Kida, 1991]). 
Finally, a number of “environmental factors” are likely to have a significant impact on 
auditor judgments.  These factors reflect natural elements in the audit professional environment 
such as accountability [Gibbins and Newton, 1994], time budgets [McNair, 1991], justification 
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[Ashton 1992], litigation risk [Pratt and Stice, 1994], reliability of evidence [Ramage, et al., 
1979], and more broadly, audit costs [Colbert and O’Keefe, 1995].  The competitive environment 
in public accounting dictates that the auditor develops a cost effective audit program.  Therefore, 
auditors are likely to weigh both risks and costs in designing and executing tests.  Very costly 
audit tests or large samples, for instance, may be utilized only in perceived high risk situations.  
Each of these environmental factors has been found to significantly affect auditor judgments. 
2.2.5 Detected Errors 
The product of auditor risk assessments, program plans, and execution of tests affects the 
eventual set of errors that are detected.  The important question raised by the model is how 
representative detected errors are of actual errors.  Festge [1979] raised the same issue in his 
discussion of Ramage, et al. [1979]. His main concern was the auditor’s objectives in testing 
various accounts. For example, were tests designed specifically to look for overstatement errors? 
Given the complexity of the error detection process, it is an empirical question as to the extent to 
which detected errors are representative of actual errors.  For example, a deviation of assessed 
risks from actual risks or improper execution of tests can lead to a failure in detection.  Recent 
audit research findings question whether, in fact, program plans are sufficiently risk-adjusted 
[Wright and Mock, 1999 and 1993], suggesting that even if risk assessments are accurate, it is 
not a trivial matter to then appropriately design and execute audit tests.  Further, confirmation 
reliability studies provide evidence that detected errors may not represent the actual error 
characteristics of the population.  For instance, studies by Engel and Hunton [1999], Armitage 
[1990], Caster [1990], Sorkin [1978], and Warren [1974] all found that accounts receivable 
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confirmations detected more overstatement than understatement errors even though the actual 
number of seeded errors of each type was equal.  In addition, Waggoner [1990] provides 
evidence of undetected deviations in an experiment involving assessment of control risk.  Thus, 
collectively, there are reasons to believe that detected errors may not be fully representative of 
the actual error population, raising significant questions about the ability to generalize results 
from studies relying exclusively on detected errors.  
3.0 REVIEW OF PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
In this section, findings from the auditing literature are discussed for each of the variables 
in the bottom portion of the model in Figure 1 (error detection process), leading to an analysis of 
the findings. As previously discussed, error detection is depicted as having three main 
components: risk assessment, program planning and execution. Further, error detection is 
affected by several factors (e.g., auditing standards, decision tools, auditor knowledge, and 
environmental factors). Findings in the literature are discussed below as they relate to the three 
components of the error detection process together with the factors affecting that process. 
3.1 Risk Assessment 
3.1.1 Materiality Assessment 
Materiality has been widely defined as an amount that is large enough to influence an 
individual user’s decisions. Materiality directly impacts audit risk and audit program planning.  
Thus, it is presumed that if materiality is set too high, the discrepancy between actual and 
detected errors will increase. Although no study has examined this issue, four studies have 
considered the amount of error(s) that would affect a reasoned decision-maker. In his 1981 study, 
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Kinney finds that the average magnitude of detected errors deflated by normal earnings is very 
small for most accounts.  In contrast, in a study of quarterly corrections of previously reported 
quarterly earnings, Kinney and McDaniel [1989] find that the corrected amounts relative to 
quarterly earnings were material.  Through a meta-analysis of nine studies from over 1500 audits 
across fourteen years, Kinney and Martin [1994] find that average aggregate adjustments 
resulting from detected errors reduce earnings and assets by two to eight times the minimum 
amount that would materially misstate the financial statements.3  Based on these findings, Kinney 
and Martin argue that the auditing process does, indeed, improve the precision of the financial 
statements. 
In addition to earnings, materiality may be assessed in terms of the impact on key 
financial ratios.  Turner [1997] finds that immaterial errors may combine to create substantial 
variances in some ratios, particularly profitability ratios based on income statement amounts.4 
Turner’s study is based on a simulation of seeded errors across three balance sheet accounts and 
three related income statement accounts that were not only individually immaterial, but also 
immaterial in the aggregate.  Turner calculated a series of ratios based on the tainted data and 
compared them to the corresponding ratios based on the accurate data. 
 Given the results in the foregoing studies, while the magnitude of detected errors suggests 
                                                 
3
 Kinney and Martin [1994] define the minimum amount that would materially misstate 
the financial statements based on Pany and Wheeler [1989]. Accordingly, aggregate 
misstatements greater than or equal to either 5 percent of net income or 0.5 percent of total 
revenue or total assets are considered to be material. 
4
 Interestingly, Dutta and Graham [1998] also demonstrate this point using an analytical 
approach rather than examining seeded errors. 
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that auditing serves to improve the decision usefulness of financial statements (by improving 
precision and reducing bias), the findings by Turner [1997] suggest that auditors need to use 
more stringent criteria than traditional levels of materiality when evaluating individual detected 
errors for adjustments. 
3.1.2 Audit Risk 
Audit risk is defined in auditing standards as the risk an "auditor may unknowingly fail to 
appropriately modify his opinion on financial statements that are materially misstated" [AU 
312.02].  Auditing standards further recommend that auditors set audit risk at an appropriately 
low level [AU 312.09].  Auditors plan the engagement based upon the level of audit risk they 
hope to achieve. Thus, it stands to reason that an inverse relationship exists between audit risk 
and error detection. ] That is, as audit risk is set lower, more audit work will be performed and, 
presumably, more errors will be detected.  It also follows that the more errors detected, the 
greater the likelihood that detected error rates will approximate actual error rates in the 
population, particularly with regard to material errors since, as noted above, audit risk is based on 
an ex ante materiality threshold.  To date, no research has been done to test these assumptions. 
Research on audit risk has focused primarily on the degree to which practitioners use the 
audit risk model. Daniel [1988], for example, finds that rather than using the components of the 
audit risk model to assess overall audit risk, practitioners tend to consistently set audit risk at five 
percent. More recently, Houston et al. [1999] find that the audit risk model captures managers’ 
and partners’ planning decisions when errors are discovered, but not when fraud is discovered. 
Due to the high exposure and sensitivity of fraud, auditors use a much lower detection threshold 
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in such circumstances than for unintentional errors. 
3.1.3 Assessment of Inherent Risk and Control Risk 
In contrast to the previously discussed areas of materiality and audit risk assessment, 
there are many studies relying on detected errors to infer the level of inherent risk and control 
risk present. 
3.1.3.1 Inherent Risk 
Inherent risk is the risk that a material error enters into a client’s accounts. Not 
surprisingly, greater inherent risk is associated with a higher rate of detected errors [Wallace and 
Kreutzfeldt, 1995; Waller, 1993].  Most prior research in the area falls into two categories: (1) 
error characteristics associated with various financial statement accounts, and (2) risk factors 
associated with client-specific characteristics. 
 A common characteristic reported in several studies is that errors in sales and accounts 
receivable accounts tend to be overstatements [DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Icerman and 
Hillison, 1991 and 1990; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986; Ham, et al., 1985; Johnson, et al., 1981; 
and Ramage, et al., 1979].  Another common finding is that errors in cost of goods sold and 
accounts payable accounts tend to understate the account balances [Icerman and Hillison, 1991 
and 1990; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986; Ham, et al., 1985].5  Findings for the inventory 
account are, however, mixed.  Icerman and Hillison [1990], Johnson et al. [1981] and Ramage, et 
                                                 
5
 In contrast, Chan and Mo [1998] find that for local Chinese companies operating in 
Hong Kong, accounts payable tends to be overstated.  However, the authors point out that this 
finding is due to the inability of the internal control systems of these companies to take into 
account the unique business practice of Chinese companies; namely, their requirement of 
prepayments for purchases.  
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al. [1979] find no directional bias relating to inventory errors, whereas Icerman and Hillison 
[1991] report that most inventory errors overstate the balance. 
 In addition to error direction characteristics, Ham, et al. [1987, 1985] find that accounts 
receivable errors have greater absolute magnitude than inventory errors.  For property and 
casualty insurers, Bell and Knechel [1994] find that loss reserve and reinsurance accounts are the 
accounts most likely to be subject to errors. 
 A few studies have focused on the factors associated with client-specific inherent risk 
characteristics. Client size is one.  Several researchers report that client size is inversely 
proportional to the incidence of detected errors (e.g., Wallace and Kreutzfeldt [1995]; Entwistle 
and Lindsay [1994]; Icerman and Hillison [1990] and Kinney and McDaniel [1989]).6  In 
contrast, DeFond and Jiambalvo [1991] find no relationship between the incidence of corrected 
prior errors and company size. 
A second client-specific inherent risk factor concerns client management. Management 
competency, integrity and controls all tend to be inversely related to the incidence of detected 
errors in the financial statements [Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1995]. At the same time, 
management focus on attaining budgets as well as achieving a particular return on total assets are 
associated with higher detected errors [Johnson, 1987]. Further, many detected errors result from 
differences between management and auditor judgment [Bell, et al., 1998]. 
 A third client-specific inherent risk factor relates to client personnel. In general, Johnson 
[1987] finds that larger errors are detected in companies experiencing personnel problems. Not 
                                                 
6
 A possible exception is Ham, et al. [1985] who find this relationship for inventory but 
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surprisingly, employee inability is also the cause for many detected errors. For instance, Bell, et 
al. [1998] find that manual computations tend to result in more detected errors than automated 
computations. Similarly, Waller [1993] and Houghton and Fogerty [1991] find a higher 
likelihood of error with non-systematically processed transactions than with systematically 
processed ones. Perhaps, as found in Bell, et al. [1998], employees may be either unable to 
identify or properly process such transactions. 
Industry is a fourth client-specific inherent risk factor considered.  A few studies report 
considerable variability in error rates across industries (e.g., Maletta and Wright [1996]; Waller 
[1993]; Ham, et al. [1985]; and Johnson, et al. [1981]).  In other studies, however, no particular 
industry concentration, in terms of frequency of errors, was found (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 
[1991]; Kinney and McDaniel [1989]). Through an awareness of the factors that increase 
inherent risk, auditors can adjust their audit programs accordingly, thereby improving error 
detection. 
3.1.3.2 Control Risk 
Control risk is the risk that a client’s system of internal controls fails to detect a material 
error. As expected, a higher control risk has been associated with a higher detected error rate 
[Chan and Mo, 1998; Wright and Wright, 1996; Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1995; Icerman and 
Hillison, 1990; Roberts and Wedemeyer, 1988]. As the assessed strength of internal controls 
declines, not only does the frequency of errors increase, but the resultant errors are also more 
likely to have an effect on income [Wright and Wright, 1996; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986].  
                                                                                                                                                             
not for other areas. 
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Indeed, Wallace and Kreutzfeldt [1991] find that the existence of an internal audit department is 
associated with fewer and smaller (i.e., less material) errors. 
In contrast, Waller [1993] finds a low association between the incidence of misstatements 
and assessed control risk at the assertion level, while in his study of errors in UK audits, Johnson 
[1987] finds that control risk traits are rarely associated with detected errors. However, Johnson 
notes that his findings might be due to the broad nature of his internal control evaluation together 
with the fact that nearly all of the companies in his sample were public firms that may have had 
at least adequate controls.  
Entwistle and Lindsay [1994] also report that few misstatements are caused by failure to 
comply with internal controls.  Further, Bell, et al. [1998] find that audit differences that related 
to control attributes are rarely associated with inadequate controls over assets/records but rather, 
are more likely associated with inadequately skilled staff, improper/inadequate independent 
verifications or improper documents/records. Indeed, Wallace and Kreutzfeldt [1991] cite 
independence as the most critical characteristic of the internal audit function (a control device) in 
reducing the magnitude of errors. 
On a related note, Ferris and Tennant [1984] find that when auditors identify compliance 
errors (e.g., a price footing and extension error or an unbilled shipment error), their control 
assessment is impacted by the nature of the error.  That is, they find that assessments of control 
risk are affected by the perceived type (price footing/extension compared to unbilled shipment), 
monetary impact (present or absent), and intentionality (related party or unrelated party) of the 
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error.  As auditors detect compliance errors they may re-assess inherent and control risks and 
adjust their audit programs accordingly, presumably improving error detection. 
3.1.4 Business risk 
Business risk is the potential loss to an auditor because of a particular client relationship. 
Four factors have been shown to affect business risk: client size, industry, ownership structure, 
and client financial condition (e.g., Wallace and Kreutzfeldt [1995]; Maletta and Wright [1996]; 
and Walo [1995]). Houston, et al. [1999] find that auditors respond to increased business risks by 
modifying both audit investment (more audit evidence is collected) and audit fee (a risk premium 
is added). 
As previously noted in the section discussing inherent risk, in general, larger companies 
tend to have stronger internal control systems and fewer relative errors [Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 
1995]. With respect to industry, Maletta and Wright [1996] find industry to be an important 
consideration for audit planning because fewer errors are found in regulated industries than 
unregulated industries. For property and casualty insurers, Bell and Knechel [1994] find a higher 
risk of irregularities with respect to reinsurance because of related party transactions. 
Interestingly, though, Walo [1995] does not find any differences in audit planning related to 
clients in industries with a lower (as opposed to higher) incidence of auditor litigation.  
The final two client-specific factors impacting auditors’ business risk are public (as 
opposed to private) ownership structure and a weak (rather than strong) client financial 
condition. Walo [1995] as well as O’Keefe, et al. [1994] find that publicly owned companies 
increase auditors’ business risk thereby increasing the scope of the audit planned by the auditor. 
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Clients with a weak financial condition also increase the business risk of an audit, and result in 
an expanded audit scope [Walo 1995]. Relatedly, O’Keefe, et al. [1994] find that increases in a 
client’s leverage produce increases in the client’s business risk, which, in turn, produce increases 
in the auditor’s business risk, resulting in significantly more audit hours assigned to audit 
managers and partners. 
As with assessments of inherent risk and control risk, business risks are expected to 
impact the audit program the auditor subsequently develops. Presumably, increases in business 
risk are expected to require enhanced program planning aimed at improving error detection. It 
may also be argued that business risk affects the level of audit risk. That is, auditors could set the 
acceptable level of audit risk lower to compensate for a higher perceived level of business risk 
(see, for example, Arens and Loebbecke [1997]). Houston, et al [1999] do not find support for 
this presumed relationship between business risk and audit risk, and thus the model in Figure 1 
does not show that particular link.  
3.2 Program Planning/Development of Audit Program7 
When controls are strong, auditors are expected to rely on them to improve audit 
efficiency. As a result, it is not surprising that the use of substantive tests is inversely related to 
assessments of internal control [Hirst and Koonce, 1996; Bedard, 1989; Ferris and Tennant, 
1984].  Furthermore, the higher the assessments of inherent and control risks, the more likely 
auditors are to extend the audit program, thereby increasing the likelihood of detecting errors.  
This relationship may lead to a potential “self-fulfilling prophesy” problem in evaluating the 
                                                 
7
 For a comprehensive review of the literature on program planning, see Bedard, Mock 
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findings of detected error studies.  That is, assume that an auditor under-estimates the level of 
risks (i.e., more errors are present than expected).  Since risks are assessed as low, the auditor 
may accordingly plan a lower level of tests.  This plan may then result in the detection of fewer 
errors than are present.  Thus, the findings of prior error detection studies that lower risks are 
associated with fewer errors may be confounded by the impact of the risk assessment on the 
effectiveness of audit program plans. 
3.2.1 Determining the Nature of Tests 
Archival studies by Bedard [1989] and Mock and Wright [1999, 1993] surprisingly do 
not find a strong association between client risks and program plans (nature and extent of tests). 
That is, plans do not appear to be “risk-adjusted.”  Mock and Wright [1993] contend this may be 
due to the widespread use of standard audit programs as a result of accountability and 
defensibility.  If such programs are robust in detecting a wide variety of likely errors, this practice 
may enhance effectiveness but impair efficiency. However, use of a standard program may 
impair an auditor’s ability to add needed audit tests for unusual types of errors or fraud. 
Bell and Knechel [1994] provide an in-depth examination of 259 audit differences from 
28 audits of property and casualty insurance companies.  They analyzed the audit procedures 
used to detect errors and found evidence that suggests analytical procedures and client inquiry are 
highly effective.  Those two audit methods uncovered over 56% of the errors detected.  In 
addition, certain substantive procedures were also effective at uncovering errors. Recomputation 
and vouching procedures uncovered 28% of the errors detected. Similarly, in separate archival 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Wright [2000]. 
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studies of audit adjustments, Wright and Ashton [1989], Kreutzfeldt and Wallace [1986], and 
Hylas and Ashton [1982] find that “attention-directing” procedures involving client inquiry 
(particularly through casual conversations), expectations based on prior years' errors, and 
analytical review are inexpensive audit tools that signaled at least one-third of the detected 
adjustments. 
3.2.2 Determining the Extent of Tests 
Mock and Wright [1993] report that the planned extent of tests, rather than the nature of 
tests is related to the level of (changes in) some client risks. However, Mock and Wright [1999] 
find a stronger association between risks and nature of testing than between risks and extent of 
testing.  Indeed, Hackenbrack and Knechel [1997] find no evidence that audit effort (measured as 
total audit hours or audit hours by rank) is associated with control reliance. These findings may 
be due to economic pressures to control the amount of testing and/or auditors’ difficulties in 
adapting plans to client risks. 
Extent of tests may be operationalized as simply the sample size. It is not surprising that 
large samples can yield different results than small samples. For example, Wurst, et al. [1991] 
find that rectification (i.e., rectifying or “fixing” the sample for all detected errors and making 
“inferences about the total amount of errors remaining in the unsampled portion of the 
population” [Wurst, et al., p. 335]) can substantially reduce the risk that the population balance is 
inappropriately rejected when sample sizes are 150 and 300, but not when the sample size is 65. 8 
3.2.3 Determining the Timing of Tests 
                                                 
8
 Recent evidence exists that sample sizes in practice now are quite small, e.g., 25-30, and 
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Only one error study addresses the issue of the timing of the audit tests - - Cohen and 
Hanno [2000].  In an experimental study, they find that auditors plan more interim testing when 
both a strong corporate governance and a strong control philosophy are present (i.e., a significant 
interaction). However, a high level of variability in responses is present, so timing of tests must 
depend on other factors not captured in their study. 
3.2.4 Determining Staffing for Performance of the Audit 
The decision of staffing for the performance of audit tests has received scant attention in 
the literature.  Wright and Wright [1997] find that auditors with greater industry experience tend 
to use more experienced personnel to perform tests for misstated accounts. 
Based on survey information provided about actual audits by partners, O’Keefe, et al. 
[1994] find that increases in a client’s risk measures result in differences in assigned audit work.  
Specifically, for a public (as opposed to a non-public) client, all staff levels were assigned 
significantly more time. Further, Hackenbrack and Knechel [1997] find that public (as opposed 
to private) clients consume a higher proportion of hours by “high grades” (as opposed to “low 
grades”) of labor. That is, public clients consume relatively more manager and partner time than 
do non-public clients. Similarly, O’Keefe, et al. [1994] find that increases in a client’s leverage (a 
measure of business risk) result in significantly more audit hours being assigned to partners and 
managers while increases in a client’s inherent risk result in significantly more audit hours being 
assigned to staff and senior auditors. 
                                                                                                                                                             
determined through non-statistical sampling (e.g., Messier, et al. [2000]). 
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3.3 Program Execution/Conducting Tests and Evaluating Evidence 
Given the program the auditor develops for use in detecting errors (Section 3.2), the 
auditor then proceeds to execute that program, conducting audit tests and evaluating test 
evidence. This program execution phase directly impacts error detection, and is susceptible to 
two key risks that will be discussed below: sampling risk and non-sampling risk. 
3.3.1 Sampling Risk 
The risk an error is not identified through sampling has received some attention in the 
literature. In their simulation, Neter and Loebbecke [1975] conclude that not all sampling 
techniques work equally well in all cases.  Rather, given differences in error rates among 
accounting populations (ranging from low to very high), the effectiveness of selection procedures 
(e.g., simple random sampling or stratified random sampling) or evaluation methods (e.g., using 
mean-per-unit estimators, difference estimators, ratio estimators, or some combination of these 
methods) varies considerably for samples of size 65, 100, and 200.  Indeed, further work by 
Neter and Loebbecke [1977] as well as work by Ramage, et al. [1979] indicate that neither ratio 
nor difference estimators consistently yield reliable results in sampling - - especially when the 
population error rate is low or the error amounts are large and in only one direction. Nonetheless, 
Neter and Loebbecke [1977] conclude that using mean-per-unit estimators works reasonably well 
with stratified random sample sizes of 100 or 200. 
Prior research has also discussed the “disposition” of errors identified by statistical 
sampling. As noted earlier, Wurst, et al. [1991] find that rectification can substantially reduce the 
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risk that the population balance is inappropriately rejected with larger sample sizes, but not with 
smaller sample sizes. 
Further, inroads have been made into the issue of whether auditors isolate errors detected 
in statistical (as well as non-statistical) sampling. The consensus of prior research is that auditors 
frequently isolate errors identified in audit sampling when they believe the errors to be unique in 
nature (e.g., Wheeler, et al. [1997]; Dusenbury, et al. [1994]; Burgstahler and Jiambalvo [1986]). 
And, although Burgstahler and Jiambalvo [1986] conclude that isolation of errors identified in 
audit sampling is not generally appropriate, more recent studies have not only concluded that 
auditors are judicious in their use of isolation [Dusenbury, et al., 1994] but also that isolation 
can, at times, be justified on both theoretical and practical grounds [Wheeler, et al., 1997]. 
In spite of the Dusenbury, et al. and Wheeler, et al. findings, auditors’ use of isolation has 
an important implication for the relationship between detected and actual errors.  That is, to the 
extent that auditors inappropriately isolate errors detected through sampling, they do not project 
them to the population. Accordingly, with isolation, detected errors may be even less 
representative of actual errors than in cases where no isolation occurs. 
3.3.2 Non-Sampling Risk 
The risk an auditor fails to recognize errors by, for instance, misinterpreting the results of 
audit procedures or failing to use or conduct an effective test has received attention from prior 
researchers. In general, auditors appear to have their limitations; for instance, Moeckel and 
Plumlee [1989] find that auditors are generally as confident in inaccurate/incomplete memories 
as in accurate ones. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that non-sampling risk is a significant 
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concern in practice. For example, in a recent case (California Micro Devices) the auditors issued 
an unqualified audit opinion on financial statements that had been materially misstated because 
they "failed to exercise appropriate professional skepticism" [SEC, 1999]. That is, the auditors 
failed to investigate the client's write off of about one-third of its accounts receivable balance 
and, therefore, failed to detect the fraud. 
Four non-statistical techniques appear to be effective at detecting errors: client inquiry 
[Bell and Knechel, 1994; Wright and Ashton, 1989; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986; Hylas and 
Ashton, 1982]; developing expectations based on prior year errors [Wright and Ashton, 1989; 
Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986; Hylas and Ashton, 1982]; analytical review [Bell and Knechel, 
1994; Wright and Ashton, 1989; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986; Hylas and Ashton, 1982]; and 
recomputation [Bell and Knechel, 1994].  If auditors fail to employ the appropriate statistical or 
non-statistical tests, they may fail to identify financial statement errors.  Findings from behavioral 
research in auditing reveal that non-sampling risk may also occur as a result of the use of 
decision heuristics with biases, such as anchoring and adjustment [Kinney and Uecker, 1982], 
recency effects [Tubbs, et al., 1990; Ashton and Ashton, 1988], and the dilution effect 
[Hackenbrack, 1992].  For instance, a recency effect implies that the order in which evidence is 
obtained may impact the final decision made as to whether there is an error or not. 
3.4 Factors Affecting Error Detection 
Besides sampling and non-sampling risk, several other factors also affect error detection. 
They are: auditing and firm standards; decision tools/aids; auditor knowledge, experience, 
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motivation, ability, ethics, and decision heuristics; and environmental factors. The following sub-
sections will discuss the research findings for each of these factors. 
3.4.1 Auditing and firm standards 
Only one study addresses the impact of auditing and firm standards on detected errors. In 
their study of 232 quality control reviews of audits of independent school districts in Texas, Deis 
and Giroux [1992] find that audit quality (defined as the probability that the auditor will both 
discover and report a breach in the client’s accounting system) improves when auditors know 
their work will be subject to quality control reviews. This also suggests “accountability” at the 
firm level can increase audit effort, presumably leading to enhanced error detection. Indeed, there 
have been many behavioral studies of accountability, which generally show that accountability 
improves performance. However, recent research on “justification” suggests auditors may do 
what they think a superior wants to see rather than what may be needed.9  
Tangentially, Elder and Allen [1998] find that auditors from firms with more structured 
error projection procedures (e.g., computerized work papers) are more likely to project to the 
population errors detected in sampling than auditors from firms with less structured error 
projection procedures. Thus, firm standards impact the degree to which errors identified in 
sampling are projected to the population balance.  
                                                 
9
 See Rich, et al. [1997] and Gibbins and Newton [1994] for reviews of this literature. We 
also  discuss accountability and justification as an environmental factor affecting auditors’ ability 
to detect financial statement errors in a later section. 
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3.4.2 Decision tools, decision aids 
We are not aware of any study that directly addresses the impact of decision tools and/or 
decision aids on auditors’ ability to detect errors. However, several studies indirectly address this 
issue. Mock and Wright [1999, 1993], Ashton [1992], Bedard [1989], and Wright [1988] all 
consider how decision aids affect the design of program plans, which ultimately can affect error 
detection. Mock and Wright discuss the impact of standard audit programs on program planning, 
while Ashton examines the impact of justification and mechanical aids on judgment 
performance. Wright also investigates the effect of prior work papers on program planning, and 
Bedard examines the impact of prior audit programs on subsequent audit programs. Additionally, 
Messier, et al. [2000] as well as Kachelmeier and Messier [1990] report on the impact of 
decision aids on auditors' selection of sample sizes. As noted above (see Section 3.2.2), because 
extent of tests may be operationalized as changes in sample sizes, auditors' use of decision aids to 
determine sample sizes can, by extension, affect error detection.  
Further, several studies consider how decision aids affect auditors’ judgments related to 
error detection. For instance, Bonner, et al. [1996] investigate the effects of decision aids on 
auditors’ judgments about error frequencies while Jiambalvo and Waller [1984] as well as Daniel 
[1988] study the effects of decision aids on auditors’ assessments of audit risk. Davis [1994] 
investigates whether decision aids impact auditors’ judgments about the probability of a going 
concern problem and Eining, et al. [1997] and Pincus [1989] study whether decision aids affect 
auditors’ judgments about the probability of management fraud. Libby and Libby [1989] look at 
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a mechanical decision aid to enhance the aggregation of multiple risk factors in control risk 
judgments. 
3.4.3 Auditor knowledge, experience, motivation, ability, ethics and decision heuristics 
As previously noted, auditor-specific characteristics affect an auditor’s ability to detect 
financial statement errors.  Indeed, many of these characteristics have been studied in tandem.  
For instance, Bonner, et al. [1996] find that experienced auditors organize financial statement 
errors by audit objective rather than transaction cycle thereby enhancing their ability to assess 
audit risks.  Thus, experience affects the way that auditors organize error information. In turn, it 
is expected that this error knowledge will impact the design of audit programs, ultimately 
affecting the detection of errors. 
Despite differences in knowledge organization, Bonner, et al. [1996] also find that all 
auditors experience difficulty in both retrieval and aggregation when determining conditional 
probabilities (e.g., the probability of an error occurring given the existence of a particular risk 
factor). Further, Ashton [1991] finds that regardless of experience level, auditors do not have 
very accurate knowledge of the relative frequency with which errors occur, (although this may, in 
part, be due to the fact that auditors do not often encounter errors).10 In contrast, Houghton and 
Fogarty [1991] find that because auditors of longer tenure have greater knowledge of their clients 
(e.g., knowledge of prior errors), they are better than new auditors at predicting risky areas. 
The behavioral auditing literature provides evidence that industry specialization benefits 
auditors in terms of knowledge of the presence and frequency of unique industry errors, which is 
                                                 
10
 See Nelson [1994] for a review of the literature identifying factors that hinder auditors’ 
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expected to be valuable in planning appropriate audit tests.11 Owhoso, et al. [2000], Solomon, et 
al. [1999], and Wright and Wright [1997] provide direct evidence of the benefits of industry 
experience on auditors' error detection. In a case study with seeded errors, Owhoso, et al. find 
that within industry specialization (banking and healthcare), audit seniors and managers detected 
more mechanical and conceptual errors, respectively. Outside of their specialization, however, 
the authors report that both seniors and managers performed poorly in detecting errors. Solomon, 
et al. found that industry specialists had a greater quantity of knowledge and more specific 
business operations knowledge stored in, and retrievable from, memory for their industry of 
specialization relative to another industry.  That is, industry experience enhanced auditors’ error 
frequency knowledge and abilities to generate plausible hypotheses for an unexpected 
fluctuation. Similarly, Wright and Wright provided auditors with a comprehensive case for a 
retailing client where four material errors were present.  They report that industry specialists 
displayed both superior skills in identifying the errors present (hypothesis generation) and in 
identifying areas of audit risk. 
Indirectly, Taylor [1998] provides evidence of the benefits of industry experience on 
auditors' error detection. Taylor examined inherent risk judgments of banking and non-banking 
specialist auditors.  His results indicated an increased conservatism (inefficiency) for auditors 
lacking industry experience and provided limited support that industry specialization enhanced 
auditor sensitivity to risk variations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
ability to learn and apply frequency knowledge in auditor judgment. 
11
 See Gramling and Stone [1998] for a comprehensive review of the literature on 
specialization in the external auditing environment. 
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In addition to experience, ethical reasoning has also been found to affect an auditor’s 
ability to detect fraud (e.g., financial statement errors). Bernardi [1994] finds that managers with 
high levels of both domain-specific experience and moral reasoning are better at detecting fraud 
than managers with low levels of moral reasoning. 
Auditor motivation (which gets at the issue of rewards as well as accountability which are 
discussed below) may also impact an auditor’s ability to detect errors. Notably, Libby and Luft 
[1993] as well as Libby and Tan [1994] synthesize and test prior research that identifies 
knowledge, ability, and motivation as important performance determinants. 
3.4.4 Environmental factors including reliability of evidence and audit costs 
As stated earlier, environmental factors, such as accountability and justification, time 
budgets, reliability of evidence, litigation risk, and other audit costs may affect an auditor’s 
ability to detect financial statement errors. 
3.4.4.1 Accountability and Justification 
Previous literature has noted that accountability and justification are theoretically distinct 
concepts (e.g., Johnson and Kaplan [1991]).  As such, their differential effects have been 
reported (e.g., Peecher [1996]; and Koonce, et al. [1995]).  We focus here on the combined 
effects of accountability and justification given that the two concepts are closely linked in 
practice.  For example, given the audit review process, it is expected that accountable auditors 
would be called upon to justify their decisions.  Likewise, justifications, in the absence of an 
accountability requirement, are likely to be rare. 
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In a review of the impact of environmental factors in judgment and decision-making 
research, Arnold [1997, p. 67] notes that “accounting decision makers do not derive judgments in 
an environment free of repercussions from outside the experimental conditions, but 
rather...individuals in accounting organizations are generally held to some level of accountability 
for their decisions.” Indeed, when Gibbins and Newton [1994] asked auditors to provide 
accounts of situations in practice in which they have been held accountable, they reported that 
accountability is not only pervasive in the audit environment, but that there are multiple 
“accountabilities,” such as to peers, the client, and regulatory bodies, and these forces result in a 
complex set of relationships and expectations. Therefore, if the preferences of the superior are 
unknown, an auditor who is held accountable for his work is more likely to exert greater effort 
and care in performing audit tests and, thus, more likely to detect errors. However, the 
preferences of a superior may also lead an auditor to make judgments to conform with the views 
of others to curry the favor of those to whom they are held accountable (Lerner and Tetlock 
1999). This could lead to less ability to detect errors, if, for instance, the superior stressed audit 
efficiency and a lower than optimal level of testing is done.  
3.4.4.2 Time Budgets 
Time budgets are used to motivate staff to work effectively and efficiently [McNair, 
1991].  Indeed, the amount of time allocated to audit a client (as a whole and by area) will likely 
have a significant impact on the nature, timing, extent, and staffing of the audit, and that, in turn, 
is likely to impact the detection of errors.  For instance, if time budgets “are set too tight, they 
can lead to dysfunctional behavior, such as premature sign-off,” where tests are either not 
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performed or performed in a haphazard manner [Gist and Davidson, 1999, p. 101].  Premature 
sign-off would presumably result in fewer errors being detected. If time budgets are too lax, 
efficiency will be reduced. 
 In a related vein, a few studies have investigated the impact of time pressure on decision-
making quality [Smith, et al., 1997; Brown and Solomon, 1992; McDaniel, 1990]. Findings from 
these studies indicate that generally, time pressure negatively affects an auditor's decision-
making quality. However, previous research suggests that moderate time pressure can enhance 
performance [Glover, 1997], since decision-makers may narrow their focus to exclude peripheral 
cues (i.e., task-irrelevant cues) while still considering central cues (i.e., task relevant cues). In 
addition, processing speed is increased, which enables the decision-maker to consider more 
central cues within the allotted time. As time pressure increases from moderate to extreme, 
performance decreases as decision-makers narrow their focus to the extent that central cues are 
excluded from consideration. This expectation is consistent with prior psychology findings 
suggesting that time pressure has an inverted “U-shaped” effect on performance (e.g., Payne, et 
al., 1988).   
3.4.4.3 Litigation Risk 
No study has demonstrated the impact of litigation risk on detection of errors. However, 
Brumfield et al. [1983], through recounting of experiences, and Pratt and Stice [1994], through 
empirical data, document that the litigation environment ultimately affects audit planning 
decisions. Pratt and Stice [1994, p. 641] note that “litigation risk is considered by auditors in the 
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planning and pricing of audit services,” with auditors extending testing when litigation risk is 
considered to be higher. 
3.4.4.4 Reliability of Evidence 
Two types of audit evidence have received a great deal of attention by researchers 
studying the reliability of evidence: accounts receivable confirmations and analytical procedures. 
Confirmation reliability studies are remarkable for the consistency in results. Studies by Engel 
and Hunton [2001], Armitage [1990], Caster [1990], Sorkin [1978], and Warren [1974] all 
seeded errors into accounts and sent confirmations to determine if confirmees detect the seeded 
errors and report them to the auditors. The general finding is that confirmees are more likely to 
detect and report unfavorable errors (errors that overstate the balance) than favorable errors 
(errors that understate the balance). Also, a large percentage of the seeded errors are not detected 
by confirmations.  For example, in Caster’s [1990] study, only 47 percent of the errors were 
detected and reported. 
These findings have a significant, yet heretofore not fully considered impact on the 
interpretation of prior error detection studies. In two different ways, they clearly demonstrate that 
detected errors may not be representative of the underlying error population. First, the fact that 
fewer than half the seeded errors are reported to auditors demonstrates that detected error rates 
can significantly understate actual error rates. Second, the fact that confirmees consistently 
demonstrate a bias towards reporting more overstatement than understatement errors 
demonstrates that detected error characteristics can significantly differ from actual error 
characteristics. Specifically, the statement often found in archival error studies that more 
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accounts receivable errors overstate the balance than understate the balance is called into 
question in that this “result” may simply be an artifact of an inherent bias in confirmation 
evidence. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of analytical procedures at detecting errors has also 
received a great deal of attention in the literature. As previously noted, prior research has found 
analytical procedures to be a highly effective and efficient procedure for detecting the errors 
identified in archival studies (e.g., Bell and Knechel [1994]; Wright and Ashton [1989]; 
Kreutzfeldt and Wallace [1986]; Hylas and Ashton [1982]; Kinney [1979]). Also, a number of 
studies examine the efficacy of various regression methods for conducting analytical procedures. 
(See Wallace, et al. [1995] for a summary of this research.) More recently, Chen and Leitch 
[1998] simulate the monthly financial statements of 150 companies with seeded errors to assess 
the error detection performance (including Type II or  risk) of structural analytical procedures 
relative to other analytical procedures.12  They conclude that because structural and stepwise 
models seek to determine the “correct” balance in an account by incorporating the structure of a 
firm’s financial and economic activities, they are superior to ARIMA, X-11, and Martingale 
models in detecting errors.  Similarly, Wilson and Weld [1997] report that auditors using 
                                                 
12
 The “other” models include: stepwise, ARIMA, X-11, and Martingale models.  
Structural models directly incorporate structural relationships within the entity (i.e., endogenous 
variables) as well as within the economic environment of the organization (i.e., exogenous 
variables) in determining “correct” account balances.  Stepwise models similarly incorporate 
endogenous and exogenous variables in determining “correct” account balances, but do so 
indirectly using regression analysis.  In contrast, ARIMA (auto-regressive, moving average), X-
11, and Martingale models determine “correct” account balances using the unadjusted balance of 
a particular account, time series models that explicitly incorporate trends and seasonal variations 
in account balances, and the balance of an account from a prior period, respectively.  
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regression analysis to estimate account balances when performing analytical review should 
transform the data to reduce autocorrelation. By doing so, auditors reduce Type I errors and, thus, 
improve audit efficiency. 
Despite the aforementioned virtues of analytical procedures for detecting errors, in a 
review of the literature on analytical review (AR), Koonce [1993] reports that auditors 
experience difficulty in the diagnostic phases of AR (e.g., problem representation, hypothesis 
generation, information search and hypothesis evaluation). These findings are particularly true 
for inexperienced auditors. Koonce further reports that in planning, auditors have a bias toward 
expanding “detailed testing when AR indicates potential problem areas. However, when AR 
indicates no apparent problems, auditors are generally unwilling to reduce subsequent testing” 
[Koonce, 1993, p. 71]. However, empirical results by Pasewark and Strawser [1992] show 
evidence of auditor willingness to reduce testing when the findings of analytical procedures are 
favorable. This difference from earlier studies cited in Koonce may be due to greater reliance on 
analytical procedures as a result of competitive pressures to improve audit efficiency. 
Accordingly, while AR may have the potential to be effective and efficient for identifying errors, 
because auditors have difficulty with the diagnostic phases of the task it is unclear whether AR is 
truly effective in detecting errors in the accounts.  
3.4.4.5 Audit Costs 
In an archival study of compliance with GAAS based on the Oregon State Board of 
Accountancy Enforcement program from 1978-1987, Colbert and O’Keefe [1995] find that 
compliance with GAAS’s reporting standards is less likely for small audit firms (five or fewer 
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partners) as well as when the client is a local government as opposed to a profit making or not-
for-profit entity. Because of the costs associated with investments in knowledge and the ability of 
the auditor to discover errors, small audit firms are less likely to keep abreast of changes in 
GAAS and are more likely to be in noncompliance. Similarly, because a great deal of industry-
specific knowledge is required to audit local governmental units (including generally accepted 
governmental auditing standards together with the Single Audit Act in addition to GAAS), 
auditors from smaller firms who audit local governmental entities are less likely to keep abreast 
of changes in the industry-specific knowledge required for those types of audits. 
 With the exception of Colbert and O'Keefe's study, there is no prior research that directly 
examines the impact of audit costs on error detection. However, it is reasonable to posit that 
some necessary audit tests may not be performed or the extent of testing reduced in an attempt to 
control costs, especially in today's competitive audit environment. The effect of this action may 
result in the non-detection of some errors that are present.  
4.0 IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section of the paper identifies variables or issues revealed by the model that are 
largely unexplored or in need of further research.  Methodological suggestions are also provided 
to address the central issue posed by this review, i.e., the problem of drawing inferences from 
studies of detected errors to accurately reflect actual errors.  Specifically, a multi-method 
approach is called for to overcome some of the problems inherent in archival research on 
detected errors. 
4.1 Risk Assessment 
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4.1.1 Materiality Assessment 
How does materiality impact the correspondence between actual and detected errors? If 
materiality is set too high, several large errors may go undetected.  If materiality is allocated to 
specific accounts (e.g., Dutta and Graham [1998]), how does that impact error detection?  These 
questions have not been addressed to date in the error detection literature.  An audit simulation, 
in conjunction with a field experiment, could be performed to provide insights regarding these 
questions. For instance, auditors could be placed in an audit simulation with seeded errors and 
the experimenter would manipulate materiality. For example, auditors may be given preliminary 
results from inventory counts, where one case sets materiality at $10,000 and another sets 
materiality at $50,000.  In each case, auditors would be asked about the extent of additional 
testing based on the findings to date. Results would be compared to assess whether the 
materiality manipulation affected the detection of errors.  
4.1.2 Audit Risk 
How does audit risk affect the design of program plans?  Do audit risk considerations 
(i.e., Type II or  risk) impact error detection?  If so, how?  Are detected errors more 
representative of actual error characteristics as audit risk is set lower (e.g., from 10% to 5%)?  
Also, what affects the auditor’s assessment of audit risk? Is the relationship between acceptable 
audit risk and level of testing the same regardless of the scope of the audit (e.g., financial 
statement or fraud audit)? All of these questions are unanswered. A simulation, with seeded 
errors, and a laboratory-type experiment, with auditors as subjects, would need to be carefully 
designed to study these questions.  In particular, to establish a benchmark, a case for a particular 
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audit area could be utilized that was subject to intense audit efforts by a participating firm where 
a high level of confidence exists that all errors were detected. The research could then examine 
the correspondence between differing levels of audit risk and the error detection capabilities. 
4.1.3 Assessments of Inherent Risk and Control Risk 
Extensive research has been conducted in this area.  A major open issue is the extent to 
which inherent and control risk assessments lead to a self-fulfilling prophesy, that is, the higher 
the risk assessments, the more testing that is done, hence the greater the number of errors 
detected.  However, Mock and Wright [1999, 1993] do not find strong evidence that audit 
programs are indeed risk adjusted.  Are auditor risk assessments accurate?  Some research 
suggests they are accurate, e.g., Bedard and Wright [1994]; Waller [1993].  Do auditors adjust 
plans significantly in response to risk assessments?  If so, how does this impact error detection? 
In the past, firms tended to employ a standard audit program that tested for a broad array of errors 
 (see, e.g., Bedard [1989]). However, firms indicate they will now and in the future perform more 
analytical procedures and less substantive testing (e.g., KPMG’s Strategic Systems Lens or BMP 
Approach). As a result, greater focus will be placed on a narrower set of evidence, and, thus, it is 
critical that this evidence is highly diagnostic in detecting errors that may be present in the 
client’s setting. 
Many of the archival error studies were specifically performed to help auditors assess 
inherent risk (e.g., Wallace and Kreutzfeldt [1995]; Waller [1993]; Houghton and Fogarty 
[1991]; Wright and Ashton [1989]; Johnson [1987]; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace [1986]). The 
research shows which accounts are most affected, the direction of the effects, and client-specific 
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risk factors (e.g., size, client management, client personnel, and industry).  A major shortcoming 
to date has been the failure to consider and control for potentially biased audit evidence (e.g., 
confirmations) and the above mentioned self-fulfilling prophecy problems. A full-scale audit 
simulation would be necessary to address these concerns with alternative tests conducted and 
seeded errors in accounts along with various levels of assessed inherent and control risks.  In this 
case, a simulation has a major advantage over an archival study, because it is not necessary to 
control for potentially biased auditing procedures.  For example, it is possible that other accounts 
receivable audit procedures (e.g., vouching subsequent cash receipts) would detect more of the 
understatement errors, thus compensating for the bias inherent in the confirmation process.  This 
question has not been studied to date.  If that is the case, and it can be shown that archival error 
rates are truly representative of actual error rates, we would feel more comfortable with 
suggestions, such as in Nelson [1994], to provide auditors with summary error frequency 
knowledge as derived from archival studies. 
4.1.4 Business Risk 
Most of the research in this area has focused on how the factors affecting business risk 
(e.g., industry, ownership structure, client financial condition) impact audit planning For 
example, Pratt and Stice, [994] found that certain factors such as the client’s financial condition 
resulted in higher assessed levels of business risk and a corresponding increase in the amount of 
audit evidence to be examined.  However, no research has been done to assess whether 
differences in business risk actually affect error detection.  These results would then need to be 
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compared to findings related to some of the studies we recommend above, such as, how 
differences in audit plans impact detection of errors.  
4.2 Program Planning 
When controls are strong, auditors are expected to rely on them to improve audit 
efficiency. That is, in such a situation, auditors should perform less costly tests (nature), test 
fewer items (extent), perform more interim testing (timing), and/or utilize less experienced 
personnel (staffing). Despite this, Bedard [1989] finds that auditors frequently employ a “same-
as-last-year” (SALY) heuristic in developing their audit programs. She posits that the use of the 
SALY heuristic may impair audit efficiency. Further, Mock and Wright (1999, 1993) find that 
auditors frequently do not test controls, presumably because for smaller clients extending 
substantive tests is viewed as more efficient than doing an extensive evaluate and testing of 
controls. An experiment could be conducted to assess whether and to what extent use of the 
SALY heuristic impairs audit efficiency and/or effectiveness. For instance, cases could be 
developed where the situation had changed dramatically since the previous year. In one case, 
aimed at assessing efficiency, the client may have corrected a major flaw in its internal controls 
based on last year’s audit suggestions in the management letter. In another case, aimed at 
assessing effectiveness, the client may have installed a new computer system that has not as yet 
been tested. Subjects would be given last year’s workpapers and asked to write programs for this 
year’s audit. If subjects employ the SALY heuristic, they will not be sensitive to these dramatic 
changes. The only prior study to address this issue (Wright 1988) finds that auditors tend to 
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continue conducting even ineffective tests but appear to adapt the program to changes in risks. 
However, further study of this matter is needed.  
4.2.1 Nature of Tests 
Most of the research on the nature of audit tests has been concentrated on two specific types of 
audit evidence: analytical procedures and confirmations (primarily accounts receivable). In large 
part, the research has focused on assessing the effectiveness of these procedures at detecting 
errors.  But very little research has been done to assess the effectiveness of other types of audit 
evidence.  How reliable are bank confirmations or legal letters of representation?  Does vouching 
invoices over a certain dollar amount catch all the errors of a certain size?  Is recalculation of 
client figures effective?  How many errors are detected through verbal inquiry?  Some of these 
questions may be difficult to study, but others could be done with controlled field experiments.  
For example, an archival and longitudinal study of legal letter representations could be 
performed, following up on the actual disposition of cases, thus, comparing the actual outcome to 
the predicted outcome in the legal letter. 13  
                                                 
13 An exploratory experimental study on this issue was performed by Krogstad et al. (2000). 
Using law students, they find that attorneys are less willing to provide estimates of the 
likelihoods [and more accurate estimates as compared to a delphi panel] and amounts of 
litigation contingencies when (1) there is a potential loss of privilege and (2) there is increased 
uncertainty about unfavorable outcomes.  They also find an interaction between materiality and 
privilege such that with privilege when materiality is low, lawyers are less willing to provide 
auditors information. These results question the value of attorney letters in providing candid and 





4.2.2 Extent of Tests 
In years past, when statistical sampling was more in vogue, auditors tended to draw large 
samples of transactions, often in excess of 100, to test such things as payroll transactions, sales, 
and cash disbursements.  As noted earlier, (e.g., Messier et al [2000] auditors now draw 
extremely small samples (e.g., 25-30 transactions). The rationale for such small samples is that 
very few errors occur in routine transactions due to automation of accounting (e.g., Bell and 
Knechel [1994]).  Instead, the major risks are in non-routine transactions, such as estimates.  
How correct is this assumption?  Presumably, the more transactions that are tested, the more 
errors will be detected. Also, there is the perverse effect that auditees may strategically place 
errors in such transactions knowing that auditors do not test them. An audit simulation with 
seeded errors could be performed with extent of tests as a manipulated variable to assess the 
impact of sample size on error detection. 
4.2.3  
Timing of Tests 
No study has directly examined the issue of timing of audit tests relative to error 
detection. When auditors perform substantive tests at an interim date, they also perform certain 
roll-forward procedures in order to satisfy themselves of the year end balance. Accordingly, the 
issue of timing of tests is confounded with the reliability of roll-forward procedures. Thus, 
research on the effect of timing of tests on error detection cannot be studied without controlling 




Audit staffing has also received little attention in the error detection literature to date.  
Firms tend to assign staff such that more experienced auditors work on the accounts perceived to 
be most troublesome (i.e., error prone).  But audit cost, audit risk, and business risk also appear 
to be factors that impact audit staffing decisions.  Thus, any study of the effects of audit staffing 
on error detection would have to control for each of these potential confounding variables.  It is 
unlikely that this could be achieved in an archival study or field experiment.  Also, it would be 
difficult to determine what the “correct” level of staffing is for any given engagement.  A Delphi 
panel of highly experienced auditors [Wright, 1988], however, can be used to arrive at a 
surrogate measure. 
4.3 Program Execution 
4.3.1 Sampling Risk 
Neter and Loebbecke [1977, 1975] suggest that auditors need to choose the appropriate 
statistical sampling procedures and evaluation methods given the particulars of the population.  
But in practice, few auditors appear to have an adequate background in statistics to heed this 
advice.  As discussed, Bedard [1989] finds that auditors generally select audit procedures by 
using the SALY heuristic (also, see Mock and Wright [1999, 1993]).  Chan and Mo [1998] report 
that auditors use “judgmentally determined” samples; they don’t consider population particulars 
when selecting samples.  A verbal protocol case could be developed to determine how auditors 
select samples and whether or not they do consider population particulars.  Given the use of 
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convenience samples instead of statistical sampling techniques, this is particularly becoming a 
concern. 
4.3.2 Non-sampling Risk 
Since non-sampling risk, by definition, covers all risks that are not sampling risk, this 
factor is covered throughout this section of the paper, e.g., the abilities of auditors to correctly 
assess risks, the potential self-fulfilling prophesy issue, and the use of decision heuristics with 
biases. While many of these topics (e.g., recency effects) have been investigated in prior 
behavioral research with respect to general audit decision-making, similar studies could be 
designed to directly examine the relationship between non-sampling risk factors and detected 
errors. 
4.4 Factors Underlying the Error Detection Process 
4.4.1 Auditing and Firm Standards 
Several issues remain unstudied relating to the impact of auditing and firm standards on 
error detection. Ideally, the effectiveness of a new statement or new audit procedures should be 
assessed before the Auditing Standards Board issues a new Statement on Auditing Standards or a 
new Auditing Procedures Study. Two recent examples of research on auditing standards are 
Libby and Kinney [2000], who examine the effectiveness of Statement on Auditing Standards 
Number 89, and Messier, et al. [2001], who examine the effectiveness of new guidelines for non-
statistical sampling. Research has also been conducted on the effectiveness of the peer review 
process [Wallace, 1991]. Presumably, peer review has a positive impact on quality control 
procedures of firms. This, in turn, would affect audit planning, tests conducted, and ultimately 
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error detection. However, because it is difficult to control for a number of potential confounding 
variables, such studies are rarely undertaken. 
Changes at the audit firm level are similarly complicated to study. Firm-wide differences 
in approaches to an audit (e.g., structured or unstructured) would be difficult to study because of 
confounding variables, but Elder and Allen [1998] report that different approaches to projecting 
errors from samples to populations made a difference in how many errors were actually 
projected.  A longitudinal study of one firm may be the only way to address this issue.  Samples 
of audit workpapers for years prior to and after a fundamental change in firm standards (e.g., 
instituting a peer review process) could be conducted.  However, the archival nature of such a 
study and the potential for confounding variables over time would make this approach subject to 
some limitations that have been discussed above. 
4.4.2 Decision Tools/Aids 
Auditors have a number of decision aids and tools at their disposal, including checklists, 
decomposition-and-mechanical-aggregation (DAMA) aids, expert systems, and generalized audit 
software, to name a few. To date, no prior studies have investigated the impact of decision 
tools/aids on error detection. However, Messier, et al. [2001] as well as Kachelmaier and Messier 
[1990] found that decision aids may hinder audit judgment in a sampling application.  
Kachelmaier and Mesier [p. 223] reported that some subjects seemed to work “backwards in an 
attempt to circumvent the decision aid.” In their review of prior decision-aids literature, Bonner, 
et al. (1996) report that checklists and DAMA aids have mixed results in terms of aiding auditor 
judgment in a variety of contexts other than error detection.  Thus, the question of whether 
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decision aids and tools are effective in detecting errors remains largely unanswered.  A laboratory 
experiment with seeded errors could be conducted to address this issue.  Different treatment 
groups of subjects (auditors) would receive various decision aids and tools and the control group 
would make their decisions without any decision aids or tools. 
4.4.3 Auditor knowledge, experience, motivation, ability, ethics, and decision heuristics 
A great deal of research has been devoted to studying auditor characteristics. The findings 
of this work suggest that industry specific knowledge, experience, motivation, ability, and ethical 
behavior all enhance auditor performance, which presumably would ultimately improve the 
auditor’s ability to detect errors. The heuristics literature generally shows that auditors are prone 
to the same sorts of biases as psychology students and other subjects.14  For example, when 
auditors anchor on last year’s numbers, they do not make sufficient adjustments. A variation of 
this is the SALY heuristic. Some research has been done to design procedures to help auditors 
overcome the biases inherent in heuristic decision approaches. For example, Kennedy [1993] 
looks at mechanisms to reduce recency bias such as accountability. 
Ashton et al. [1988] provide a list of research questions, many of which remain 
unanswered more than ten years later.  For example, “How effective are auditors at integrating 
several pieces of evidence when the evidence is described in the same mode versus different 
modes.” [1988, p. 118].  Questions such as this can be used to study the impact of auditor 
characteristics on error detection.  
                                                 
14
 It should be noted, however, that Smith and Kida [1991] suggest that for auditors, some 
heuristics (e.g., conservatism) may be functional and there are differences in the extent to which 
auditors are prone to biases. 
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4.4.4 Environmental factors including reliability of evidence and audit costs 
As was demonstrated earlier in the paper with accounts receivable confirmations and 
analytical procedures, reliability of evidence may be a significant confounding variable when an 
archival approach is employed to study error detection.  It is also clear from the earlier discussion 
that little is known about the reliability of most forms of audit evidence.  Thus, while 
confirmation evidence is biased towards finding more overstatement than understatement errors, 
an open question exists about potential biases in all other forms of audit evidence.  For example, 
a common finding in archival studies is that inventory errors tend to be both over and under-
statements.  But nothing is really known about the reliability of inventory audit procedures such 
as observation.  An inventory audit simulation, with seeded errors, could be conducted, similar to 
the confirmation studies, to determine the reliability of inventory audit evidence, and to 
determine if such evidence is inherently biased.  Similar cases could be designed to study other 
types of audit evidence. 
Another open area for research is the impact of attempts to minimize audit costs on error 
detection.  For example, do tighter time budgets result in fewer errors being detected?  This issue 
could be addressed with an audit simulation with seeded errors, in which different treatment 
groups received different time budgets for the same audit situation and were asked to design 
audit program plans. Asare, et al. [2000] look at analytical procedure follow-up testing and 
examine information search and effectiveness in identifying a seeded error with time budgets and 
accountability. They find that these factors affect the depth, breadth, and nature (error versus 
non-error) of testing. Relatedly, analysis of archival data regarding errors that were originally 
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undetected but later came to light (e.g., restatement situations, litigation situations, etc.) might 
yield important insights into “what went wrong,” suggesting issues impacting error detection 
and/or ways to improve practice. 
5.0  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A review of the error detection literature, in conjunction with the model of the error 
generation and detection processes in Figure 1, identifies important directions for future research. 
One important issue involves research methodology. A major limitation of archival research is 
the lack of control over possible confounding variables, and, importantly, concern over the 
representativeness of detected errors of the actual underlying error population. A multi-method 
approach (e.g., using audit simulations with seeded errors together with laboratory-type 
experiments and comparing the results) is suggested. Another possibility is to audit 100 percent 
of the transactions in a given account that has already been audited using standard audit 
procedures, and compare the results of the 100 percent audit to the standard audit to determine 
whether any material errors were missed under the standard approach, and which of the tests in 
the comprehensive audit uncovered the error(s).  
The model indicates the variables that effect error detection. It is important to control for 
these variables in future research. One of the more important variables is reliability of audit 
evidence. In their 1989 paper, Spires and Yardley reviewed the empirical research on the 
reliability of auditing procedures and concluded “with the possible exception of receivable 
confirmations, the research is sparse” [1989, p. 65].  Since that time, more is known about 
analytical procedures, but research on the reliability of most other auditing procedures remains 
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limited. Research with seeded errors is necessary to test the reliability of other audit procedures, 
such as recalculation, physical observation, scanning, vouching, etc. Using cases with seeded 
errors, the researcher controls the size and direction of errors, and can thereby determine the 
effectiveness of the procedure and possible biases inherent in the procedure. 
In considering the reliability of various types of audit evidence, additional questions can 
be investigated. For instance, Caster and Pincus [1996] provide a model of factors that affect the 
persuasiveness of audit evidence. This research should be extended to provide a ranking of audit 
procedures in terms of effectiveness and efficiency at detecting errors under different client 
conditions. For example, inventory observation might be an effective and efficient audit 
procedure for detecting errors - - but only when the auditor is reasonably knowledgeable about 
the nature of the client’s inventory. In addition, new audit technologies (e.g., embedded audit 
modules and continuous auditing) are appearing and need to be compared to more traditional 
types of evidence.  How effective are these newer procedures at detecting errors? 
Despite the presence in audit practice of a large number of decision tools and aids, very 
little research has been conducted to test the effectiveness of these decision tools and aids, 
particularly with respect to error detection.  As firms begin to change their approaches to auditing 
and increase the use of expert systems and computerized audit software, the need for research on 
the effectiveness of these techniques increases. 
Error detection is the primary objective of the audit process. That is, the auditor wants a 
high level of confidence that there are no material misstatements that go undetected. Thus, the 
relationship between error generation (what causes errors) and error detection (how errors are 
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identified) continues to be a very significant area of interest and concern to both auditing 
practitioners and researchers. 
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